Sybil resistance

FFreely · November 18, 2021, 10:31am

good pointooo my friend

hosein · November 18, 2021, 2:30pm

i agree with you

hosein · November 18, 2021, 2:31pm

I love this project

PeymanM · November 18, 2021, 2:32pm

@Shaho
How community can choose the best method? That’s the question!

hosein · November 18, 2021, 2:33pm

WoooooooooW Nice work

hosein · November 18, 2021, 2:35pm

Well done brother

alisahl · November 18, 2021, 4:46pm

Hi, In my opinion there could be more gamification levels to filter more people

bmwx · November 18, 2021, 5:18pm

Survey from commiunty thanks hossein

bmwx · November 18, 2021, 5:21pm

I’m not agree Completely but Agree with all

pooryasadidi · November 18, 2021, 5:50pm

i hanvent any idea for protect from sybil resistance

Morteza548 · November 18, 2021, 7:04pm

The Sybil attack was first introduced by Douceur while studying security in peer-to-peer networks; later, Karlof and Wagner showed that this type of attack poses a serious threat to routing mechanisms in WSNs. Sybil is an impersonation attack in which a malicious node masquerades as a set of nodes by claiming false identities, or generating new identities in the worst case . Such attacks can be easily executed in a WSN environment because the nodes are invariably deployed in an unstructured and distributed environment, and communicate via radio transmission. They are especially detrimental in applications such as data aggregation, voting systems, reputation evaluation, and geographic routing. Using a Sybil attack in location-aware routing, it is possible to be in multiple locations at the same time.

karl · November 19, 2021, 4:16am

Good write up on the topic.

Tahere · November 19, 2021, 12:00pm

Keep it up team good luck and hope for the best

shadow · November 19, 2021, 12:28pm

I agree. New solutions must be used

mohsenbrsn · November 19, 2021, 1:58pm

@morteza71 yes I agree with you bro

Morteza548 · November 19, 2021, 3:34pm

For some management operations the management agent might need to send a message to all peers in the overlay. For example, to counteract a Sybil attack, a list of blocked addresses can be circulated to all peers. A software security patch for all peers to download and install could also be sent to all peers. The number of overlay messages needed for such broadcasts is Ω(N) assuming that every peer receives exactly one message. If, in addition, all peers in the overlay use broadcast messaging for application purposes such as global search, at least N2 messages are sent. Thus overlay broadcast is impractical for large overlays as a general messaging mechanism, but in limited use it is feasible.

mohmusavi81 · November 19, 2021, 4:14pm

I’m waiting for mainnet

jacobhosseinpour · November 19, 2021, 4:19pm

I guess they are supposed to do it very well. the project future is depend on it.

sahar_crypto · November 19, 2021, 5:15pm

So far, he has acted correctly in all stages of the proposal And that gives hope.

karl · November 19, 2021, 7:47pm

I think resistance to abuse comes down to how much effort, patience & resources the team and community are willing to put forth to protect and insure the fairest distribution possible.

If “we” as early adopters have faith in the project, airdrops and token allocations can take place over time instead of upfront. I think that the strongest protection against people seeking value for nothing is requiring commitment from users.

Instead of attracting the “WHEN TOKIM” crowd who seek value for nothing, reward participants who are willing to show up and support the project in a meaningful way.

I was super impressed by the TestNet participation this community was able to achieve without having a mainnet project launched. And rewarding early contributors is vital, it just doesn’t need to be 100% upfront, i think that vesting to early contributors is one of the more robust ways in which to protect against people looking to extract the maximum value with the least amount of effort.